Abstract-Alice wishes to potentially communicate covertly with Bob over a Binary Symmetric Channel while Willie the wiretapper listens in over a channel that is noisier than Bob's. We show that Alice can send her messages reliably to Bob while ensuring that even whether or not she is actively communicating is (a) deniable to Willie, and (b) optionally, her message is also hidable from Willie. We consider two different variants of the problem depending on the Alice's "default" behavior, i.e., her transmission statistics when she has no covert message to send: 1) When Alice has no covert message, she stays "silent", i.e., her transmission is 0; 2) When has no covert message, she transmits "innocently",
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose Alice, an undercover agent lurking a foreign country, wishes to send occasional covert messages to her handler Bob. To facilitate her communication, Alice operates a radio station. The radio station plays "innocent" transmissions (say, songs) when she has no covert messages to send, and an encoded signal when she is "active", i.e., when she does have a covert message.
Meanwhile, her transmissions are constantly observed by a counterspy Willie whose job is to detect potential spies and their secret messages. Luckily for Alice, the reception to Bob is less noisier than that to Willie, aided by the fact that she uses a directional antenna that is directed towards Bob and not Willie. In this paper, we ask whether Alice can leverage this asymmetry to simultaneously ensure the following.
(a) Reliability: Bob should reliably be able to decode both the presence of covert message and the message itself, (b) Deniability: Willie, even with his best estimate, should not be able to decipher whether Alice's transmission is innocent or active, and (c) Hidability: Willie should not be able to estimate what Alice's potential message is, even assuming that Alice is active. Notice here that the constraints on Alice's transmission are rather stringent. If Alice's active transmission appears too different from her innocent transmissions, Willie can notice the difference and flag her down. On the other hand, if her active transmissions and innocent transmissions are too similar, even Bob may not be able to decode her intent and message. This makes Alice's task much more challenging than in standard information theoretic secrecy problems. In particular, if Alice chooses to use an "off the shelf" encryption scheme that is designed for secrecy only, her active transmissions -even though music to Bob's ears -would likely look very different from the songs that she plays on her station when she is innocent. Further, if Alice only keeps deniability in mind, then her messages may not hidden from Willie. As an example, if Alice naively maps each message to a unique song, then even if Willie is unable to differentiate between innocent or active transmissions, he can still decode the intended message by listening to the played song. Thus, reliability, deniability, and hidability are disparate dimensions of this challenging communication problem.
In this paper, we examine two different scenarios that Alice could find herself in. In our first scenario, Alice is "silent" by default (perhaps because she is up against a dictatorial regime). In this case, her default transmission is constrained to be 0 and her only hope is to "hide in noise", i.e., ensure that Willie cannot differentiate her transmission from noise. The second scenario that we consider is when Alice starts with an "innocent" transmission scheme that involves nonzero transmission (in our example, these could be the songs she plays in the default state). Specifically, her innocent transmissions may be thought of as being drawn uniformly from a publicly known codebook. In this scenario, Alice's best strategy for the active transmission is to "pretend" that she is sending innocent codewords by modifying them so subtly such that Bob can detect these modifications, but Willie cannot. For both these scenarios, we model the channels from Alice to Bob and Alice to Willie as Binary Symmetric Channels.
We show:
1) Under the first model we describe above (silent vs active Alice), if Alice only demands reliability and deniability, we significantly improve our previous result in [14] . Specifically, [14] We stress that in our model (unlike most prior work, c.f. [1] ) everything that Bob knows a priori about Alice's communication scheme, Willie also knows -there is no Fig. 1 . The black crosses correspond to the codewords from Alice's innocent codebook, and the red dots correspond to the codewords from Alice's active codebook.
common randomness that is hidden from Willie that Alice and Bob can leverage. The only asymmetry between Bob's and Willie's estimation abilities arises from the fact that Willie's observations of Alice's (possible) transmissions are noisier than Bob's.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Steganography
Most steganographic models make at least one of the following assumptions (none of which we make):
• Non-zero covertext/stegotext: Alice's default transmission (even if she has no hidden message to transmit to Bob) is usually non-zero in most of the works. Many works characterize the capacity of various steganographic problems -see for instance [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . An important exception to the non-zero covertext assumption occurs in the work of Bash, Goeckel and Towsley [1, 2] -we discuss this work in depth below.
• Shared secret key/common randomness: In many steganographic works, they require a key shared between Alice and Bob, for example [9] or [4] . The size of the key is usually as large as the message being transmitted. This key is usually sent via a secure channel between Alice and Bob which is not known by Willie. Also, there are some of the works by [5, 8] do not make this assumption of a shared key.
• Noiseless communication: Some literatures consider a model that the channel between Alice and Bob is noiseless. The capacity has multiplicative factor of log n increment in some scenarios [9, Chapters 8 and 13] . Some models [4] do consider an active Willie, that is, Willie can jam the channel between Alice and Bob. The work of [1, 2] , and our work here consider only random channel noise.
B. The Square Root Law
The "Square Root Law" (often abbreviated as SRL in the literature [6, 10, 11] ) can be perhaps characterized as an observation that in a variety of steganographic models, the throughput (the length of the message that Alice can communicate reliably with Bob and deniable from Willie) scales as O( √ n) in n channel uses.
In Model 1, our setting (and also that of [1, 2] ), the throughput does indeed provably scale as the square-root of the number of channel uses. However, the critical reason underlying this scaling is that we consider the scenario wherein the covertext is all-zero -Alice must "whisper very softly", since she will be detected if Willie hears something that does not look like the channel noise.
C. The work of Bash, Goeckel and Towsley
The results and techniques closest to those in this work (and indeed the starting-point of our investigations) are those of [1, 2] . However, there are important differences in the models.
• Public codes vs. shared secret keys: In our model, we consider no shared secret key between Alice and Bob that Willie does not know but [1, 2] consider a shared secret key scheme. Hence, our code is "public".
• Discrete vs. continuous channels: In our work all channels are discrete (finite input and output alphabets) -in particular, for ease of presentation we focus here on the case wherein Alice's transmissions pass through independent BSCs. In contrast, the results of [1, 2] are for channels wherein the noise is AWGN.
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• Silent/talking vs. innocent/active: In this work, we consider a more general model, that is, Alice could transmit non-zero (non-zero power) codewords other than just 0 (zero power) codeword when she is innocent (silent).
D. The work of Hou and Kramer [3]
• Stealth vs. deniability: The authors propose effective secrecy that combines the deniability (same as stealth in [3] ) and the hidability (information-theoretic secrecy). The authors use K-L divergence to measure stealth while we use variational distance. However, by using Pinsker's inequality and Reverse Pinskers inequality, these two metrics can be shown to be equivalent.
• Deniability without hidability: The encoding scheme of [3] always consider deniability and hidability together, our work shows that the encoding of deniability and hidability is separable. That is, our encoding scheme allows us to attain deniability individually, or together. So, Hou and Kramer uses stochastic encoding to attain deniability and hidability together. In our case, we only require random encoding to attain deniability, hidability can be attained by rearranging the codebook.
III. COMMUNICATION MODEL
We present the detail of two communication scenarios presented in the introduction in the following. (Also see Figure 2 .) Alice's transmission status: Depending on the model, Alice has potentially three transmissions statuses. She can be silent,
Here M is the secret message, and Mp is the public message. Alice is always transmitting it regardless of the transmission status T. Bob wishes to decode bothM andMp, when Willie is only interested in the transmissionT. We use the metric α + β to see whether Willie is able to distinguish the transmission statusT. Here, α = Pr(T = act|T = sil or inn) and β = Pr(T = sil or inn|T = act).
innocent, or active. To denote these, we use the variable T, which can take values sil, inn, or act. Alice's information: Alice (potentially) wishes to communicate a secret message m from a set {0} ∪ {1, . . . , N m } to Bob -M denotes the random variable corresponding to m. Note that here the 0 secret message means that Alice does not care about (information-theoretic) secrecy, even though she might care about deniability.
Independent of the deniable message, Alice also has a nonsecret message (or public message) m p , drawn uniformly from the set {0} ∪ {1, . . . , N mp }, that she wishes to communicate to Bob. Here M denotes the random variable corresponding to m. Note that here the 0 non-secret message means that Alice does not even wish to communicate a non-secret message (this happens, for instance, when she is silent).
To be clear, if Alice is actively trying to communicate to Bob, she then wishes to communicate non-zero values of both m and m p to Bob, but has different requirements about the reliability/deniability/hidability of m and m p , as described below. Alice's encoder:
• In Model 1, Alice is either silent or active (T ∈ {sil, act}).
-If Alice is silent (T = sil), this corresponds to m = m p = 0. Also, necessarily her length-n binary broadcast transmission x is then 0 (a vector of n zeroes). -On the other hand, if she is active (T = act) then she encodes (m, m p = 0) into a length-n binary codeword x m,0 using an encoder Enc a (·) :
. . , x Nm } of non-zero codewords is denoted by a specific codebook C a , known in advance to all parties (Alice, Bob, and also Willie). The rate R a of Alice's innocent codebook is defined as log N m /n. And the relative throughput r is defined as log N m / √ n.
• In Model 2, Alice is either innocent or active (T ∈ {inn, act}).
-If Alice is innocent (T = inn), this corresponds to
n . The prespcified set (not part of Alice and Bob's protocol design) { x 1 , . . . , x Nm p } is the innocent codebook, denoted by C i . The rate R i of the innocent codebook is defined as log N mp /n. -Similar to Model 1, if Alice is active (T = act) then she encodes (m, m p ) into a length-n binary codeword x m,mp using an encoder Enc a (·) :
. . , x NmNm p } of non-zero codewords is denoted by the active codebook C a (this is part of Alice and Bob's protocol design), known in advance to all parties (Alice, Bob, and also Willie). (For the communication to be deniable, Alice and Bob in general need to choose an active codebook C a whose properties depends on the pre-specified innocent codebook C i .) Note that, Model 1 is a special case of Model 2 by taking N mp = 0. Broadcast Channel: The transmitter Alice is connected via a binary-input binary-output broadcast medium to the receiver Bob and the warden Willie. The channels from Alice to Bob, and from Alice to Willie are respectively BSC(p b ) and BSC(p w ). By assumption, the noise on the two channels is independent, p b < p w , and Alice, Bob and Willie all know the parameters p b and p w . Bob's Decoder:
• In Model 1, Bob receives the length-n binary vector 
To prove deniability in both Model 1 and Model 2, we use a hypothesis-testing metric to quantify the deniability of Alice's code. Let the probability of false alarm Pr Zw (T = act|T = sil or inn) be denoted by α(Est Ci,Ca (·)). Analogously, let the probability of missed detection Pr M, Zw (T = sil or inn|T = act) be denoted by β(Est Ci,Ca (·)) denote respectively the probabilities that Willie guesses Alice is transmitting even if she is not, and that Willie guesses Alice is not transmitting even though she is. We say Alice's codebooks
We henceforth denote α(Est Ci,Ca (·)) and β(Est Ci,Ca (·)) simply by α and β.
For any block-length n, we say a corresponding codebook C n is simultaneously (1− )-reliable, (1− )-deniable and (1− )-secure if it simultaneously ensures that Bob's probability of decoding error is at most , has deniability 1− and the secrecy metric 
IV. MAIN RESULTS/HIGH-LEVEL INTUITION
We use the model in [14] for the first two theorems, that is the case when N m = 1.
Proof. Reliability: Recall that the codebook C n was generated by choosing 2 r √ n , with each bit of each codeword is generated i.i.d. according to Bernoulli(ρ). Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice's transmitted codeword to be x 0 , Bob's received codeword to be y b .
Note that a code C n is (1 − )-reliable if the probability of the decoded codeword x equals Alice's transmitted codeword x 0 is at least 1 − . Here, Bob checks the "typicality" of each codeword x ∈ C n with respect to y b . For notational convenience we denote wt H ( y b )/n, the fractional Hamming weight of y b , by f y ( y b ), but in most usage, to further simplify notation, we shall simply write it as f y . Following the definition of "robust typicality" 3 (for instance, see [16] ) we define A ( Y b ) (f y ) as the typical set of y b as the set of sequences whose Hamming weight is in a range around ρ * p b . That is,
Also, for each j, j ∈ {0, 1} we use p jj to denote the fraction of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that the i-th components of x and y b are respectively j and j . Hence p 00 ( x, y b ), p 01 ( x, y b ), p 10 ( x, y b ) and p 11 ( x, y b ) respectively denote the fractions of (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1) pairs in ( x, y b ), but in most usage, to further simplify notation, we shall simply write them as p 00 , p 01 , p 10 and p 11 . Then A ( X| Y b ) (p 10 , p 11 ) is the conditionally typical set of x given a particular y b , defined as the set of x such that (see Eq (2)) This definition makes sense since the "expected" value of p 10 and p 11 are respectively nρp b and nρ (1 − p b ) . Also, note that given a tuple (f y , p 10 , p 11 ), the values of p 01 and p 00 can be computed (as f y − p 11 and 1 − f y − p 10 respectively) -hence the joint type is completely determined by (f y , p 10 , p 11 ) . Further, we also define the conditionally type of x given a particular y b as follows (see Eq (3)), By this definition, we have the conditionally typical set of x given y b equals the union of the conditionally type of x given y b such that (p 10 , p 11 ) is within a certain region. Mathematically (see Eq (4)), Now, we have Bob's decoding rule as follows,
Bob decodes x if there is a unique codeword x in the conditionally typical set of a given the received codeword y b . If there are more than one codeword in the conditionally typically set, Bob returns error. If there is no such codeword in the conditionally typically set, then Bob decodes x = 0.
Given the definitions and the decoding rule, we now analyse Bob's reliability. Note that the probability of decoding error 1 , where E b,0 and E b,1 the decoding error when the transmission status T = inn and T = act respectively.
We first analyse the probability of decoding error E b,1 when the transmission status T = act. There are two types of error happen for Bob as shown in the following, 1) The missed detection error denoted by E b,11 happens if none of Alice's transmitted codeword x 0 is not "typical" with respect to the received codeword y b . That is,
The false detection error denoted by E b,12 happens if there is some codewords other than Alice's transmitted codeword, x ∈ C n \ { x 0 }, is "typical" with respect to the received codeword
Note that in Eq (8) and (9) . Here, by union bound we obtained the inequality (8) . Then, using Chernoff's bound we have (9) . Then, choosing Δ 10 = 
, we have Pr(E b,11 ) < . Now, we want to show the false detection error probability is small, it is equivalent to say, the probability of the number of codewords excluding the transmitted codeword x 0 in the "decoding ball" greater than 1 is very small. That is (see Eq (10)), Instead of calculating (C n \ { x 0 }) ∩ A ( X| Y b ) (p 10 , p 11 ) directly, we first find the number of codewords in the "decoding type" denoted by
Note that the expectation of
equals the probability of { X ∈ T ( X| Y b ) (p 10 , p 11 )} times the size of the codebook. That is (see Eq (11)), Note that,
= fyn p11n
n(p 10 +p 11 ) log ρ+(1−p 10 −p 11 ) log(1−ρ)
Here, (12) is the probability of the codeword X that satisfies the type condition given by p 10 and p 11 . Specifically, X must be satisfy the constraints that defines the type T ( X| Y b ) (p 10 , p 11 ) given the received codeword y b . The term fyn p11n
(1−fy)n p10n in (13) counts the total number of binary sequences x satisfies the fraction of 1's in the support of the given y b equal to p 11 , and similarly for p 10 . Recall that ρ is the codebook generation distribution, ρ
p00n is the probability that such x are generated. In (14), we use the fact that n k ≤ 2 nH(k/n) [15] . Since the relative throughput r is chosen to be less than r u (see Claim 1 in Appendix and the equation (17) , also note that
√ n . This means, the total number of codewords in C n in the "decoding ball"
is exponentially small. Therefore, by Chernoff's bound (see Eq (18)), This means that the exact number of codewords of the code C n excluding x 0 in the "decoding ball" has more than 1 codeword inside is of double exponentially small probability. Therefore, the probability that a random code drawn according to the distribution ρ is "bad" is double-exponentially small. Hence, the probability of false detection error Pr(E b, 12 ) is double-exponentially small.
We next analyse the probability of decoding error E b,0 when the transmission status T = inn. That is, Alice's transmitted codeword x 0 = 0.
The false alarm error denoted by E b,0 happens if there
is some codewords x ∈ C n , is "typical" with respect to the received codeword y b . So, the false alarm error can be expressed as
Similar to the analysis of the false detection error E b, 12 , we can rewrite Pr(E b,0 ) to the following,
It follows the same line of the calculation of Pr(E b,12 ), then we obtained Pr(E b,0 ) is double-exponentially small.
Therefore, combining E b,0 , E b, 11 and E b,12 , we have 12 ) ≤ . This means, the probability of Bob's decoding error is less than when the relative throughput r is chosen to be less than r u .
Deniability:
We now prove that a random code C n also has overwhelming probability of being highly deniable. This requires substantially more work than the proof of reliability in the previous section, which broadly followed somewhat standard minimum-distance decoding analysis.
Recall that a code C n is (1 − )-deniable if for every estimator Est C (.) of Willie,
But by "standard statistical arguments" [17, Theorem 13.1.1] (reprised in [2] as Fact 1), (20) is implied by the condition that
But by the triangle inequality, (21) is equivalent to
Note that p 0 ( y w ) corresponds to the n-letter distribution (over a support of size 2 n ) induced by n Bernoulli-(p w ) random variables. Similarly, the "smoothed" distribution E C [p a ( y w )] corresponds to the n-letter distribution (also over a support of size 2 n ) induced by n Bernoulli-(p w * ρ) random variables. Hence by further "standard statistical arguments",
Here (23) (1−pw) . Up to this point, the proof is similar to the proof in [2] . The remainder of this paper focuses on the challenging task of bounding the second term in (22). Clearly this second term need not be small for specific codes C -a "bad" codebook will not behave like its expectation. 4 Slightly more precisely, we aim to show that with high probability over the set of random codebooks C (drawn according to the distribution p(C)),
For notational convenience we denote wt H ( y w )/n, the fractional Hamming weight of y w , by f y ( y w ), but in most usage, to further simplify notation, we shall simply write it as f y . Following the definition of "robust typicality" 5 (for instance, see [16] ) we define A ( Yw) (f y ) as the typical set of y w as the set of sequences whose Hamming weight is in a range around p w * ρ. Specifically,
(26) Also, for each j, j ∈ {0, 1} we use p jj to denote the fraction of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that the ith components of x and y w are respectively j and j . Hence p 00 ( x, y w ), p 01 ( x, y w ), p 10 ( x, y w ) and p 11 ( x, y w ) respectively denote the fractions of (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1) pairs in ( x, y w ), but in most usage, to further simplify notation, we shall simply write them as p 00 , p 01 , p 10 and p 11 . Then A ( X| yw) (p 10 , p 11 ) is the conditionally typical set of x given a particular y w , defined as the set of x such that (see Eq (27) ).
This definition (27) makes sense since the "expected" value of p 10 and p 11 are respectively nρp w and nρ(1 − p w ). Also, note that given a tuple (f y , p 10 , p 11 ), the values of p 01 and p 00 can be computed (as f y − p 11 and 1 − f y − p 10 respectively) -hence the joint type is completely determined by (f y , p 10 , p 11 ).
Given these definitions, the term V (p a ( y w ), E C [p a ( y w )]) from (22) may be further expanded as follows (see Eq (28)).
Here both terms correspond to the difference between the distribution on y observed by Willie due to the actual code C n used, and the distribution on y if the ensemble distribution (over random codebooks) had been used. The first terms deals with the difference between these distributions for "typical" y, and the second one for "atypical" y -bounding these two terms require different techniques. Due to lack of space, we present a sketch proof showing the above three terms to be small.
For the typical y and typical x, the term (see Eq (29)) can be shown is small using similar proof as in the reliability part. Note that,
x∈Cn∩T ( X| yw ) (p10,p11) (·). And, for x ∈ C n ∩ T ( X| yw) (p 10 , p 11 ), both p Zw ( y| x) and p M ( x)) are constant. Therefore, we have (30).
So, it remains to show that C n ∩ T ( X| yw) (p 10 , p 11 ) − 4 For instance, if the codebook has only very high weight codewords, Theorem ?? already indicates that such a code cannot be highly deniable. The point is, of course, that the probability (over the ensemble of random codebooks drawn according to the distribution p(C)) of such a code instantiating is small. 5 Note that this definition is slightly different than that of "strong typicality", for instance in [15] , since the "width" of the set is proportional to corresponding values of the probability distribution for robustly typical sets. Such a definition is useful when (as in our case) some values in the probability distribution itself might be "very small".
is small enough. To show this, we use the similar techniques as in (11)- (17) .
Hence, with doubly exponentially close to probability 1, p 11 ) . So, we have (31). For the atypical x or y w term, it is not hard to show that both two terms are also small by Chernoff's bound.
Therefore, we show that when r l < r < r u . Alice communicate with Bob 1 − reliably and Willie is 1 − deniable with doubly exponential close to probability 1. Proof. We use the same codebook C as in the reliable and deniable communication in [14] . We set R s = I (X; Y b ) − I (X; Y w ) and R s = I (X; Y w ). Then, we randomly group the codewords into 2 nRs groups, each group has 2 n Rs codewords representing a secret message M s . That is,
n Rs } to be the protection message. So, each codeword is X(M s , M s ). Bob decodes both secret message and protection message reliably since R s + R s ≤ I (X; Y b ) and it is also deniable from Willie since R s + R s ≥ I (X; Y w ). Now, we show that the secret message is also weakly secure. That is, we show ∀ > 0, ∃N ∈ N such that ∀n > N, 
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x∈Cn∩A ( X| yw ) (p10,p11) 
Proof. Bob's Reliability: Let the codebook C i be i.i.d. generated according to q (see Figure 1) , where
Alice is innocent, then she transmits the codeword x ∈ C i . On the other hand, if Alice is active, then she transmits the codewordx = x m ⊕ x s , where x m ∈ C i and x s ∈ C xm . So, the active codebook C a looks like the satellite codewords of the innocent codebook C i . For Bob's decoding, he uses two steps. The first step is using joint typical decoding to determine which satellite is transmitted. The second step is to use the same technique in [14] to determine whether Alice's transmission status T.
Here is the detail of the steps: and X(M) ⊕ X(S), which is within the variance. So, with high probability, Bob can determine the correct satellite and its centre. 2) Since the centre X(M) is determined, now we use the same techniques as in [14] . With high probability, the normal message M and the deniable message S can be decoded. Willie's Deniability: In [14] , we have that the deniability is equivalent to show the distributions of Willie's received vector Y w between the transmission status T = 0 and T = 1 have small variational distance. Here, we could use the same idea to show the distributions P i and P a have small variational distance, where P i is the distribution of Y w given that Alice is innocent and P a is when Alice is active. Instead of showing V (P i , P a ) < , we show with high probability, V (P i , E(P i )) < /3, V (E(P a ), E(P i )) < /3 and V (P a , E(P a )) < /3. By triangle inequality, we have V (P i , P a ) < .
To show V (P i , E(P i )) < /3 and V (P a , E(P a )) < /3 with high probability, it is the same as in [14] . The key idea is to show is takes the most value of V (P i , E(P i )) in the typical y w 's, and for each type class of x, there are exponentially many codewords, so that we can use concentration inequalities.
I ( x; y w ) = p 00 log p 00 (1 − f x ) ( 
respectively.
We are interested in the value of I ( x; y w ) where the triple (f y , p 10 
By Taylor's expansion with center at (ρ * p w , ρp w , ρ(1 − p w )), the empirical mutual information I ( x; y w ) can be obtained by the following equation,
